Abstract. This paper purpose is twofold. First, it offers a critical review of the proofs of existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria in nonatomic games. In particular, it focuses on the alternative ways of formalizing the critical assumption of anonymity. Second, the paper proves the existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria by relaxing anonymity and allowing instead for "limited anonymity" (i.e. players' decisions depend on the average strategy of a finite number of players' subsets and not on the average strategy of the whole set of players). (JEL: C72, C79 )
Introduction
Game theory studies multi-person decision problems, where the payoff of each player depends on his own action as well as on the actions taken by all other players. Given that players are assumed to act strategically, they try and anticipate the behavior of their opponents, assuming that the opponents do the same. This framework seems appropriate in situations where the number of agents is not too large, such as in oligopoly, war games, bargaining games and so on, because these are cases where the behavior of each player substantially affects the payoff of the opponents. Is such framework well suited also for situations representing conflict with many players where "single player has no influence [...] but the aggregative behavior of 'large' sets of players can change the payoff" (Schmeidler, 1973) ? Actually, it is. The class of nonatomic games enables to analyze phenomena such as political elections, distribution of the traffic on the roads of a large city, and in general all those situations where individual players are "macroscopically negligible" (Mas-Colell, 1984) .
Despite the irrelevance of one single player, in these situations the aggregate behavior of a large enough subset of players impacts on the others' payoff. This is particularly evident in a game with positive externalities (resp. with partial rivalry) like in Konishi et al., (1997a Konishi et al., ( , 1997b , i.e. a game where the payoff of player i depends positively (resp. negatively) on the number of agents playing in the same manner of i. A typical example of a game with partial rivalry is city traffic: when a driver chooses the road to take with his car, he estimates how much traffic is present in each alternative. Traffic is the distribution of all other drivers on the road network at that time. The use of a congested good, such as internet, highways, electric grids, represents another interesting example. Congestion, as traffic, can be measured by the agents' distribution on the network at a given time.
With countably many players, we can define a sequence of n-players games. At any point of the sequence, the impact of each player's action on the opponents' payoff is non negligible, except at the limit of n → ∞. Nevertheless, in the situations mentioned above, the number of players is naturally very large and each player is aware that his actions will not affect the other players' payoff. Hence, it seems conceptually more appropriate to model these situations as nonatomic games.
The class of nonatomic games allows to address problems where there are uncountably many players (a continuum, in the Euclidean space). More formally, a nonatomic game is a game where the set of players is endowed with a nonatomic measure.
Nonatomic games are worth studying for several reasons, already highlighted by Aumann in a different context (Aumann, 1964) . Firstly, they are good approximations of real life situations, otherwise misrepresented by finite settings. Secondly, they represent the economic idea of negligibility; moreover, only in the continuum setting some results arise in an exact form (such as the exact equivalence between CORE and competitive equilibria of an economy; see Aumann, 1964, and Dubey and Shapley, 1994) . Thirdly, the continuous approximation allows to use the powerful tools and methods of real analysis.
Moreover, when we assume anonymity, proving the existence of a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies is relatively easy under very general conditions. Roughly speaking, anonymity means that the characteristics of a single player are irrelevant to determine his impact. Only actions matter, not the identity of who takes them.
More precisely, if we assume anonymity, an equilibrium in pure strategies exists without requiring strong hypothesis (concavity) on the payoff functions.
